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I. INTRODUCTION
As images of recent bombings in subways and buses in London on
July 7, 2005 make their way across newspapers and news stations
internationally, the international community relives the atrocious images of
the attacks on New York's World Trade Center and is reminded that the
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threat of terrorism has not vanished.! Ever since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001 on New York's World Trade Center, the possibility of
future terrorist activities is a concern that all countries are faced with.2
In an attempt to halt future attacks, countries have enacted domestic
legislation and international treaties. The United States government has
done this by enacting the Authorization for Use of Military Force (herinafer
"AUMF"), which grants President Bush and the Executive Branch an
unprecedented amount of power,3 which includes the ability to detain
individuals for life terms.4 This practice, as well as other tactics regarding
interrogation techniques and conditions at detention camps, has fueled
recent criticism within the international community that the United States is
violating international humanitarian law, including the Geneva
Conventions,' in its attempt to eliminate terrorism.
6
The United Nations (hereinafter "UN") has also been in the process of
creating ways to eliminate terror by drafting treaties to suppress the threat
of international terrorism. 7  One of these treaties, the International
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism known as the
Nuclear Terrorism Convention (hereinafter "NTC"),8 was recently adopted
by the UN General Assembly, and the United States has voiced its desire to
sign the NTC9 when it will be open for signature and ratification in
September 2005.10 The goal of the NTC is to prevent terrorists from
1. Alan Cowell, Bombings in London: Bombings; Subway and Bus Blasts in London kill at
Least 37, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2005.
2. See generally Mary H. Cooper, Nuclear Proliferation and Terrorism: Can "rogue" states
and terrorists acquire nuclear weapons? THE CQ RESEARCHER, Apr. 2, 2004.
3. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)
[hereinafter AUMF].
4. See id.; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
5. Katharine Q. Seelye, Threats and Responses: The Detainees; Guantanamo Bay Faces
Sentences of Life as Permanent US. Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.16, 2002.
6. Symposium, The Status of Persons Held in Guantanamo Under International
Humanitarian Law, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 96, 97 (2004) [hereinafter The Status of Persons Held in
Guantanamo].
7. See G.A. Res. 51/210, 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996).
8. Int'l Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Apr. 13, 2005,
available at http://www untreaty.un.orglEnglish/Terrorism/English 18_15.pdf (last visited Mar. 17,
2006) [hereinafter NTC].
9. Press Release, State Dep't Documents, U.N. Gen. Assembly Adopts Nuclear Terrorism
Treaty (Apr. 13, 2005) [hereinafter U.N. Gen. Assembly Adopts Nuclear Terrorism Treaty].
10. See Press Release, Gen. Assembly, Gen. Assembly Adopts Convention on Nuclear
Terrorism; Will Open for Signature at Headquarters 14 September, U.N. Doc. GA/10340 (Apr. 13,
2005) [hereinafter Gen. Assembly Adopts Convention on Nuclear Terrorism].
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gaining access to nuclear weapons.1' Additionally, the NTC contains a
provision dealing with the treatment of detainees.' 2
This comment will explore the impact and effectiveness of the NTC by
comparing the United States' policy pertaining to the treatment of detainees
to the text of the NTC. Part II will discuss the current problem with the
treatment of detainees by the United States, focusing on Guantanamo Bay
detention camp in Cuba and Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Part III will
provide background information on international humanitarian law,
focusing on the United States' classification of al-Qaeda and Taliban
detainees as "enemy combatants." Additionally, Part III will discuss the
development of the position taken by the Untied States' courts regarding
their ability to exercise jurisdiction over detainees. Part IV focuses on the
goals of the NTC and the likelihood of ratification. Part V will provide an
in-depth analysis of Article 12 of the NTC pertaining to the treatment of
detainees and the application of domestic and international law.
Additionally, Part VI examines the effect of the United States' credibility
by signing on to the NTC.
II. UNITED STATES' CURRENT TREATMENT OF PRISONERS AND
DETAINEES
As numerous human rights groups continue to raise concerns about the
United States' treatment of detainees 3 at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba and in
the detention camp at Abu Ghraib in Iraq, more information revealing
human rights violations by the United States has surfaced. 4  These
criticisms include allegations of torture, cruelty and inhumane treatment of
11. Id.
12. NTC, supranote8, art. 12.
13. Among human rights groups criticizing the U.S. include the U.S. Human Rights Network,
Amnesty International, the Human Rights Watch, and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. See
Richard J. Wilson, United States Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: The Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights Responds to a "Legal Black Hole," 10-SPG HUM. RTS. 2 (2003); See also Press Release,
U.N. Experts Address Concerns Regarding Guantanamo Bay Detainees, U.N. Doc. HR/ 4860 (June 23,
2005) [hereinafter Experts Address Concerns].
14. There have also been allegations of human rights violations within United States borders.
One example is found within U.S. v. Awadallah, where Awadallah was detained and held for over
twenty days in various locations throughout the United States in extremely poor conditions and
practically tortured by FBI agents for possible connections with the attacks on New York's World Trade
Centers. U.S. v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp 2d 17, 20 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Awadallah's legs, for instance,
were shackled in irons and an agent "kicked his leg shackles and pulled him by the hair to force him to
face an American flag." Id. at 24.
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detainees, arbitrary detention, violations of detainees' rights to health, and
their lack of due process rights."
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Congress passed a
joint resolution titled Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). 16
The AUMF authorized the President:
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations,
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized,
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons,
in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism
against the United States by such nations, organizations or
17persons.
A. Conditions at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba
Pursuant to the AUMF, United States forces were sent to Afghanistan
by the President in an attempt to break up the Taliban government, along
with the terrorist network, al-Qaeda.' 8 Beginning in January 2002, United
States forces started transferring individuals captured by the American
military in Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay.' 9
Presently, there are approximately five hundred and ten individuals
detained in Guantanamo, 0 who have not received fundamental principles of
due process.2' These violations arise, since they have yet to have a chance
to "challenge their confinement, to object to the failure [of the United
States] to recognize them as prisoners of war, to consult with legal counsel,
or even to advance claims of mistaken capture or identity., 22 Additionally,
these detainees have only received limited rights to correspond with their
families, and any visitation rights have been limited to diplomatic missions
15. Experts Address Concerns, supra note 13 ("Many of these allegations have come to light
through declassified Government documents.").
16. AUMF, supra note 3.
17. Id. § 2(a).
18. Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727, 728 (9th Cir. 2004). Initially, U.S. forces were sent to
Afghanistan to wage a military operation, but this military operation has commonly been referred to as a
"war" but never formally declared a war. Id.
19. Id. Guantanamo Bay is a United States naval base located in Cuba which the United
States occupies pursuant to an indefinitely termed lease entered into by Theodore Roosevelt with the
Cuban government in 1903. Id. at 728, 734 n.9.
20. Guantanamo: Pentagon Announces Release or Transfer of Eight Detainees, ASSOCIATED
PRESs, July 21, 2005.
21. Gherebi, 374 F.3d at 728-29.
22. Id.
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from the detainees' home countries and from the International Committee
of the Red Cross.23
In addition to there being claims of violations of due process, 24 there
have also been allegations of violations of basic human rights. 25  The most
profound abuse is the effect that the environment at Guantanamo Bay has
had on the mental health of the detainees.26 The conditions at Guantanamo
have led numerous detainees to attempt suicide.27 The most shocking abuse
that has occurred at Guantanamo Bay is the interrogation of detainee
Mohammed al-Qahtani, which lasted fifty days.2 ' The interrogation routine
that officers at Guantanamo Bay followed included a tag team of
interrogators who would wake al-Qahtani up at four in the morning and
sometimes interrogate him until midnight.2 These techniques and the
treatment of detainees have spawned United States criticism internationally,
along with United States lawmakers.3°
23. Wilson, supra note 13.
24. Id. (These allegations of due process violations include no access to counsel or to courts,
no charges officially brought against these detainees, and the authorization by President Bush to allow
"the detention and trial by military commission of any current or former member of the al-Qaeda
organization.").
25. Experts Address Concerns, supra note 13. These violations include releases of pictures
taken by the press depicting the arrival of detainees at Guantanamo Bay shackled and wearing blackened
goggles. Wilson, supra note 13. Additionally, the interrogation techniques employed by the U.S.
soldiers have come under attack, including certain procedures known as "stress and duress" which are
condemned by many international bodies as cruel and inhumane treatment. Id.
26. Carlotta Gall & Neil A. Lewis, Threats and Responses: Captives; Tales of Despair from
Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2003.
27. Id. These conditions center on the uncertainty of the detainees' future including when and
if they will be released, detention in very small cells, isolation from other detainees, and the allowance
of only one one-minute shower per week. Id; See also Neil A. Lewis, Red Cross Criticizes Indefinite
Detention in Guantanamo Bay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2003, at Al (discussing reports by human rights
groups regarding 21 detainees who because of their unknown fate at Guantanamo, have attempted 32
suicides in 18 months).
28. Adam Zagorin & Michael Duffy, Inside the Interrogation of Detainee 063, TIME, June 20,
2005. The interrogation and treatment of Mohammed al-Qahtani was uncovered by "an 84-page secret
interrogation log obtained by Time." Id.
29. The officers also employed techniques such as "Fear Up/Harsh," "Pride/Ego Down," the
"Futility Approach" and the "Circumstantial Evidence Theme," all in attempts to weaken the detainees
into giving a forced confession. Id.
30. Additionally, former President Jimmy Carter has urged Washington officials to close down
Guantanamo Bay, along with President George W. Bush stating that his Administration was researching
other alternatives to Guantanamo Bay. Id.
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B. Conditions at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq
The discovery of atrocious violations of international humanitarian law
by the United States at the detention camp Abu Ghraib occurred when
pictures of naked Iraqi prisoners surfaced in international newspapers and
magazines. 3' These pictures taken by United States soldiers depicted naked
Iraqi prisoners, whose heads were covered by hoods, being forced to
simulate sexual conduct as United States soldiers posed in the pictures.3 2
Abu Ghraib prison was established during Saddam Hussein's
(hereinafter "Saddam") regime, which imprisoned thousands of criminals
[and political prisoners] "who were subjected to unspeakable torture at the
whim of" Iraqi soldiers.33 Additionally, each cell contained a large hook
that was used by Iraqi soldiers to hang inmates from either their feet or their
hands.34 The Bush Administration invaded Iraq in March of 2003,35
ostensibly because of the unacceptable practices of the Saddam
dictatorship.36 However, United States soldiers have used the same hooks
as used by Saddam to hang Iraqi detainees, practicing the same behavior
that was used by Saddam which was so atrocious that necessitated the
invasion of Iraq by the United States.37
III. THE UNITED STATES POLICY REGARDING DETAINEES:
CLASSIFICATION OF "ENEMY COMBATANTS"
The detention of individuals at Guantanamo Bay has become the
cornerstone for criticism of the United States' position on "human rights
and international humanitarian law in its 'war on terrorism.' ' 38
International humanitarian law is comprised of the four 1949 Geneva
31. Johanna McGeary, The Scandal's Growing Stain, TIME, May 17, 2004.
32. Iraqi prisoner Haider Sabbar Abed al-Abbadi recounts to a Time reporter the horrible
evening when U.S. soldiers forced detainees to perform sexual acts while U.S. soldiers took pictures. Id.
According to al-Abbadi, "he was told to masturbate, though he was too scared to do more than pretend,
as a female soldier flaunted her bare breasts". Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Hassan M. Fattah, The Struggle for Iraq: The Tally; Civilian Toll in Iraq Is Placed at
Nearly 25,000, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2005.
36. McGeary, supra note 3 1.
37. Waleed Sabih al-Delami was detained at Abu Ghraib by U.S. officials and tells a TIME
reporter that U.S. officials "suspended [him] from such a hook three times during his five-month stint in
U.S. custody" and his feet were tied and his arms were bound behind his back as U.S. officials shouted
at him: "You are a terrorist! You are a terrorist!" Id.
38. The Status of Persons Held in Guantanamo, supra note 6 at 97.
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Conventions and two 1977 Additional Protocols.39 When an individual is
detained during an international armed conflict, he is classified as either a
combatant or a civilian.4° If an individual is classified as a combatant, he
will receive protection as a prisoner of war (POW) under the Third Geneva
Convention and if an individual is a civilian, the Fourth Geneva Convention
protects him.4' President Bush and his Administration have placed these
detainees within a "legal black hole' 2 'by failing to classify Taliban and al-
Qaeda detainees as either combatants or civilians,43 but rather classifying
these detainees as "unlawful combatants"44 or "enemy combatants." 5
A. The Geneva Conventions
In order for an individual to receive treatment as a POW under the
Third Geneva Convention, the country that the detainee is from and the
detaining country must be a party to the Geneva Convention.4 Article 4 of
the Third Geneva Convention states that POWs are persons who have been
detained by the enemy and must fit into a classification delineated therein. 7
Paragraph 1 of Article 4 provides that POW status will be granted to
"[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
39. Id. at 98; The four Geneva Conventions include: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative
to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third
Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
40. The Status of Persons Held in Guantanamo, supra note 6, at 100.
41. Id.
42. Wilson, supra note 13. The term "legal black hole" references the status of the detainees
at Guantanamo Bay. Id. The U.S. claims that the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions do not apply to
them, thereby, placing these detainees without the protections of international humanitarian law. Id.
43. Ari Fleischer, White House Press Sec'y, Statement on the Geneva Convention (May 7,
2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases2003/05/20030507-18.html (last visited
Sept. 30, 2005); The Status of Persons Held in Guantanamo, supra note 6, at 100.
44. The Status of Persons Held in Guantanamo, supra note 6, at 100.
45. Gherebi, 374 F.3d at 728.
46. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 2 ("In addition to the provisions which shall
be implemented in peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them."); see also Fleischer, supra note 43.
47. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 4.
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forces. 48 Additionally, pursuant to Paragraph 2, the definition of POW
includes "[m]embers of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if
this territory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps,
including such organized resistance movements" as long as one of the
following conditions is met:
a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
c) That of carrying arms openly;
d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.
49
The Third Geneva Convention provides additional protection in
Article 5 which states:
[s]hould any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed
a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy,
belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal. 50
1. Treatment of al-Qaeda detainees
The Bush Administration explicitly states that the Geneva Conventions
do not apply to al-Qaeda detainees, because they are an international
terrorist group and are not a party to the Geneva Conventions. 51 No dispute
has arisen to this position taken by the Bush Administration. 52 Therefore,
al-Qaeda detainees are not afforded any protections or rights of the Geneva
Conventions, nor are they granted POW status. 3
48. Id. art. 4, para. 1.
49. Id. art. 4, para. 2.
50. Id. art. 5.
51. Fleischer, supra note 43.
52. In Re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d 443, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Clearly, al-
Qaeda is not a contracting party to the Geneva Conventions, members of al-Qaeda are not afforded any
protections of the treaties).
53. Fleischer, supra note 43.
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2. Treatment of Taliban detainees
The Bush Administration's position is that prior to a detainee receiving
POW status and treatment, four conditions must be satisfied:
1) "[T]hey would have to be part of a military hierarchy;"
2) "[T]hey would have to have worn uniforms or other
distinctive signs visible at a distance;"
3) "[T]hey would have to have carried arms openly;" and
4) "[T]hey would have to have conducted their military
operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war."
54
The Bush Administration clearly stated that the Third Geneva
Convention will apply to Taliban detainees, since Afghanistan is a party to
the Geneva Convention, even though the United States does not recognize
the Taliban as the legitimate government, rather, as the de facto
government." However, the Administration, in its May 7, 2003 Statement
by the Press Secretary on the Geneva Convention, reasoned that POW
status would not be granted to Taliban detainees irrespective of the fact that
the Geneva Conventions would apply to them5 6 The administration asserted
that the Taliban detainees have not met the four pre-conditions necessary
for an individual to be granted POW status pursuant to Article 4 of the
Third Geneva Convention. The Administration did not make this decision
based on an individualized determination; rather, its decision was based on
a generalized grouping of all Taliban detainees without analyzing specific
situations.5"
Subsequently, the Administration's initial policy that the Geneva
Conventions apply to Taliban detainees without the protections afforded to
POWs was overruled in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases.59 The court
held that the President could not "rule by fiat that an entire group of fighters
covered by the Third Geneva Convention falls outside of the Article 4
definitions of 'prisoners of war."' 60  Since the President cannot make a
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See infra text accompanying note 57 (discussing the pre-conditions to POW status).
57. The Administration concludes that Taliban detainees have not sufficiently distinguished
themselves from the civilian population because they have not worn uniforms or other distinguishing
items and that they have not conducted their military operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war since they have "knowingly adopted and provided support to the unlawful terrorist
objectives of the al-Qaeda." Fleischer, supra note 43.
58. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 479-480.
59. Id. at 480.
60. Id.
2006]
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broad characterization that these detainees are not POWs, 61 doubt has arisen
as to their status. According to Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention,
these individuals should receive protections of the present Geneva
Convention until a competent tribunal determines their status.62 The United
States has violated the Geneva Convention by failing to establish a
competent tribunal to determine the status of the Taliban detainees.63
B. Status as "enemy combatants"
The Bush Administration has classified al-Qaeda and Taliban
detainees as "enemy combatants" and imprisoned these individuals
pursuant to the AUMF since its inception in 2001. 64 However, this term
was not formally defined until July 7, 2004, when the Combatant Status
Review Tribunal (CSRT) was created.65 The definition of "enemy
combatant" from that Order is as follows:
[T]he term "enemy combatant" shall mean an individual who was
part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda [sic] forces, or
associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United
States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who has
committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in
aid of enemy armed forces. 6
The United States government's position is that once an individual has
been classified as an "enemy combatant," that individual "can be held
indefinitely until the end of America's war on terrorism or until the military
determines on a case by case basis that the particular detainee no longer
poses a threat to the United States or its allies. 67  The United States
government has suggested that due to the uncertain duration of the war on
61. Id.
62. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 5.
63. Even though some of the detainees filing habeas corpus petitions were granted proceedings
to determine if they were "enemy combatants" pursuant to the Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSRT), these proceedings were inadequate pursuant to Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention
because there is no evidence that the CSRT made specific findings to determine whether the detainees
are POWs. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 480; see also infra notes 160-168 and
accompanying text (discussing the inadequacies with the CSRT).
64. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 474.
65. Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. Deputy Sec'y of Defense, Memorandum on Order Establishing
Combatant Status of Review Tribunal to the Sec'y of the Navy (July 7, 2004),
http://www.defenselink.miVnews/Jul20O4/d20040707review.pdf. (last visited Sept. 29, 2005)
[hereinafter Wolfowitz Memorandum].
66. Id.
67. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 447.
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terror, it is possible that these detainees could be incarcerated for life
terms.68 It has been a long, complicated battle for detainees at Guantanamo
Bay to gain access to the United States courts to challenge their detention.
1. Challenging "enemy combatant" status for
detainees at Guantanamo Bay
Prior to the Supreme Court decision of Rasul v. Bush69 in 2004,
individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay had no way to challenge their
classification as an "enemy combatant," because the United States courts
claimed that they did not have jurisdiction to hear these cases.70  The
Supreme Court distinguished the situation pertaining to the detainees at
Guantanamo Bay from the detainees in Johnson v. Eisentrager,7 1 who were
German detainees held in China, where the United States Supreme Court
held that there was no jurisdiction to hear their habeas corpus petitions.72
The United States can exercise jurisdiction over a detainee if the United
States has sovereignty over the territory or if there is territorial
jurisdiction. 3  The distinguishing factor, which gives the United States
jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions filed by Guantanamo Bay
detainees, is that the United States exercises "complete" territorial
jurisdiction and control of the naval base in Cuba due to the express terms
of the lease agreement the United States has with Cuba.74
In finding that the United States courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas
corpus petitions from detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 5 United States courts
later determined that detainees held as enemy combatants at Guantanamo
Bay are granted protections of the due process clause.76 Specifically, the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in Gherebi that the
68. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2641.
69. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2687 (2004).
70. Id. at 2687, 2691.
71. Id. at 2693.
72. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765, 781 (1950).
73. Gherebi, 374 F.3d at 734, 738.
74. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693 n.72, 2696; see also supra note 19. The lease entered into
between the U.S. and Cuba "cedes to the U.S. 'complete jurisdiction and control' over the Base, it
recognizes the 'continuance of ultimate sovereignty' in Cuba." Gherebi, 374 F.3d at 734 (citing
Agreement Between the United States and Cuba for the Lease of Lands for Coaling and Naval Stations,
Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. 418 art. III).
75. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2696, 2698.
76. See Gherebi, 374 F.3d at 731 (holding that unlawful detainees were still afforded due
process rights and that the Judicial Branch could not allow the Executive Branch to detain foreign
citizens without allowing them any access to courts or access to counsel); See also Guantanamo
Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 464 (recognizing the detainees rights under the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment).
2006]
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government's treatment of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay by failing to
allow them access to the United States courts "is inconsistent with
fundamental tenets of American urisprudence and raises most serious
concerns under international law.
After the Rasul decision, a July 7, 2004 Order issued by Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz created the CSRT to review the status
of each enemy combatant.78 However, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia in In re Guanatanmo Detainee Cases held that the
procedures utilized by the CSRT did not meet the requirements of the Fifth
Amendment due process clause.79 The court explained that under the due
process clause, each individual detained on the basis that he is an 'enemy
combatant' must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification,
and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
neutral decisionimaker."' s The deficiencies within the CSRT's procedures
include their extensive reliance on classified information in its
determination of enemy combatant classification, their failure to allow the
detainees to review the classified information, and their prohibition against
the assistance of counsel.8 ' All of these inadequacies within the CSRT
"deprive the detainees of sufficient notice of the factual bases [sic] for their
detention and deny them a fair opportunity to challenge their
incarceration.
8 2
Even though the court in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases held that
the failure of the CSRT to allow the detainees counsel and the inability of
the detainees to view the classified information relied on by the CSRT in
determining their status as enemy combatants was deficient,83 the CSRT has
77. Gherebi, 374 F.3d at 731.
78. Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 65. The CSRT was created after the Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld decision which held that detainees at Guantanamo Bay have the right to access to counsel and
the right to due process. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2650-52. The Combatant Status Review Tribunal
(CSRT) was established to make sure that the detainees were afforded due process. Guantanamo Bay
Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 467. More specifically, the CSRT provides a procedure where
detainees have the right to hear the factual basis for their detention and they have the right to testify as to
why they should not be considered an enemy combatant. Id. at 450.
79. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 468. The due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution states that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law". U.S. CONST. amend. V.
80. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 467 (citing Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648).
81. ld. at 472.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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not modified its procedures.84 The CSRT still does not allow the assistance
of counsel; rather, it allows detainees to receive assistance from a military
officer,85 which the court in In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases held
violated the due process clause.86 Additionally, the CSRT still denies
detainees access to classified material, 7 even though this procedure was
deemed insufficient to support "a constitutionally permissible basis for the
indefinite detention of the" detainees. 88
2. Challenging "enemy combatant" status for detainees
held at Abu Ghraib in Iraq
The explicit terms of the lease that the United States has with Cuba,
pertaining to Guantanamo Bay, grant the United States courts jurisdiction to
hear claims made by the detainees held there.8 9 However, detainees held as
enemy combatants at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and other regions, cannot
challenge their status within the United States courts unless the United
States is a sovereign over that territory or exercises exclusive territorial
jurisdiction.90
The basis of the United States jurisdiction lies within the "potentially"
permanent duration of the United States' presence in the other country.9'
The United States does not have the intent to remain permanently in Iraq,
since the United States government has been discussing pulling United
States troops from Iraq.92 Since the United States presence in Iraq is not
permanent, the United States does not have jurisdiction to hear habeas
corpus petitions filed by detainees in Iraq.
93
Additionally, the CSRT does not apply to detainees held as enemy
combatants at detention centers other than Guantanamo Bay.94 The Order
84. Rear Admiral James M. McGarrah, Director of Administrative Review of the Detention of
Enemy Combatants, Dep't of the Navy, Detainees: Hearing on Detainees Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter McGarrah Hearing].
85. Id.
86. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 472.
87. McGarrah Hearing, supra note 84.
88. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 470 n.34.
89. Gherebi, 374 F.3d at 734 n.9.
90. Id. at 733-34; The U.S. Supreme Court, in Johnson v. Eisentrager, recognized that alien
enemies held outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. could not bring habeas corpus petitions in
U.S. courts. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778.
91. Gherebi, 374 F.3d at 734.
92. David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Washington Memo: Hot Topic: How U.S. Might
Disengage in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2005.
93. Gherebi, 374 F.3d at 734.
94. Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 65.
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creating the CSRT explicitly states that the CSRT only applies to detainees
at Guantanamo Bay.9 If these detainees are not covered by the Geneva
Conventions, which they will not be if they are part of a terrorist regime,9
the detainees are left with no option to challenge their possible life
incarceration, unless the United States establishes a review board like the
CSRT.
C. Other International Doctrines affording detainees protection
In addition to the protections afforded in the Geneva Conventions,
other international and domestic law exist that grants detainees not covered
by the Geneva Conventions some protections. For example, United States
Army Regulation 190-8, provides that "all persons taken into custody by
United States forces will be provided with the protections of the [1949
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War]... until
some other legal status is determined by competent authority."
98
Additionally, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides that "anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention
shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that court may
decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his
release if the detention is not lawful."9' Even though the United States has
established the CSRT, this tribunal is not competent, since the United States
court held that those procedures still violate the detainees' due process
rights.100
IV. THE NUCLEAR TERRORISM CONVENTION (NTC)
A. Background of NTC
On April 13, 2005, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,
95. Id.
96. Fleischer, supra note 43.
97. Gherebi, 374 F.3d at 731 n.7.
98. US. Army Regulation 190-8, OPNAVINST 3461.6, AFJI 3461.6, MCO 3461.1, ch. 1-5
para. a(2), in ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERFERENCES & OTHER
DETAINEES (1997), available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/arl90-8.pdf. (last visited
Mar. 17, 2006).
99. Int'l Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, art. 9, para. 4, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171. Other international conventions pertaining to human rights includes the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. Wilson, supra note 13.
100. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 472.
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known as the NTC.'01 The NTC is the first anti-terrorism convention
adopted since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 on New York's
World Trade Center. 1°2 Originally, the NTC was proposed by Russia in
1998. and resulted in seven years of drafting negotiations until its adoption
by the UN General Assembly on April 13, 2005.3 The NTC will be open
for signature at the United Nations Headquarters in New York City from
September 14, 2005 to December 3 1, 2006.' 4
The goal behind the NTC is to improve the existing international anti-
terrorism legal framework'0 5 "for international cooperation in the
investigation, prosecution, and extradition of those who commit terrorist
acts involving radioactive material or a nuclear device."' 6
Article 2 defines the offenses of the NTC. 0 7 Article 2, Paragraphs 1
and 2 of the NTC makes it an offense for any person to possess, use, or
threaten to use radioactive material with the intent to cause death or serious
bodily injury or to cause substantial damage to property or the
environment. 08 Paragraph 3 states that a person commits an offense if he
attempts to possess or attempts to use radioactive material with the intent to
cause death or serious bodily injury or to cause substantial damage to
property or the environment.Y Additionally, any person will have
committed an offense under the NTC who participates as an accomplice,
organizer, or director of another individual in violating Article 2 Paragraph
1, 2, or 3.11° Article 1 defines radioactive material as:
nuclear material and other radioactive substances which contain
nuclides which undergo spontaneous disintegration (a process
accompanied by emission of one or more types of ionizing
radiation, such as alpha-, beta-, neutron particles and gamma
rays) and which may, owing to their radiological or fissile
101. U.N. Gen. Assembly Adopts Nuclear Terrorism Treaty supra note 9; NTC, supra note 8.
102. U.N. Gen. Assembly Adopts Nuclear Terrorism Treaty supra note 9.
103. Press Release, Gen. Assembly, Ad Hoc Committee Adopts Draft Nuclear Terrorism
Convention, Culmination of Negotiations Begun in 1998, U.N. Doc. L13085 (Apr. 1, 2004) [hereinafter
Ad Hoc Committee Adopts Draft Nuclear Terrorism Convention].
104. NTC, supra note 8, art. 24, para. 1.
105. Nicolas Michael, Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and United Nations Legal
Counsel, Press Briefing on Nuclear Terrorism Convention (Apr. 12, 2005), available al
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/205/LegaCounsel-Briefing_050412.doc.htm. (last visited
Mar. 17, 2006).
106. U.N. Gen. Assembly Adopts Nuclear Terrorism Treaty supra note 9.
107. NTC, supra note 8, art. 2.
108. Id. art. 2, para. 1-2.
109. Id. art. 3, para. 3.
110. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
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properties, cause death, serious bodily injury or substantial
damage to property or to the environment.'I
Fears about possible nuclear terrorist attacks are real and imminent
concerns faced by the international community. 1 2  These concerns were
heightened when A.Q. Kahn, creator of Pakistan's nuclear bomb, admitted
that he had operated "a busy black-market trade in centrifuges, blueprints
for nuclear-weapons equipment to enrich uranium into weapons-grade fuel
and missiles capable of delivering nuclear warheads."'" 3 The most likely
threat of a nuclear terrorist attack is by a weapon called a dirty bomb, which
can be easily made with a radioactive material called cesium that is used in
X-ray machines." 4  Due to this increased risk of nuclear terrorism, 1 5 it is
likely that individuals will be detained for violations of the NTC once the
treaty is ratified.
B. Countries Reaction to NTC
The United States" 6 and approximately twenty other countries have
expressed their desire to ratify the NTC." 7 This indicates that the NTC will
probably be ratified," 8  since twenty-two countries are needed for
ratification. '19 Additionally, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan
has urged all States to become a party to the NTC. 120 Annan also stated that
the adoption of the NTC "is a vital step forward in multilateral efforts to
111. Id. artl , para. 1.
112. Cooper, supra note 2 at 299.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 300.
115. Id. at 299; Additionally, the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan states that
"[n]uclear terrorism is one of the most urgent threats of our time." Press Release, Secretary-General
Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Says Nuclear Terrorism Convention Adds Building Block to Global
Anti-Terrorism Strategy, in Remarks to Ad Hoc Committee, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/9798 (Jan. 4,2005).
116. Ad Hoc Committee Adopts Draft Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 103. The
United States is pleased that United Nations Member States have "demonstrated a seriousness of
purpose and worked together in a multilateral setting to conclude" the Nuclear Terrorism Convention.
Id.
117. Gen. Assembly Adopts Convention on Nuclear Terrorism, supra note 10. Some of the
countries who have indicated their support of the NTC are India, Russia, Syria, Pakistan, and Mexico.
Id.; Ad Hoc Committee Adopts Draft Nuclear Terrorism Convention, supra note 103.
118. Gen. Assembly Adopts Convention on Nuclear Terrorism, supra note 10.
119. NTC, supra note 8, art. 25; see also U.N. General Assembly Adopts Nuclear Terrorism
Treaty, supra note 9.
120. Press Release, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Secretary-General Congratulates General
Assembly on Adoption of Int'l Convention on Nuclear Terrorism, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/9817 (Apr. 13,
2005).
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prevent nuclear terrorism" and that "[tihe Convention will help prevent
terrorist groups from gaining access to the most lethal weapons known to
humanity. 1 21  Due to the large support of the NTC internationally,
including that of the UN, the NTC will likely be ratified by the necessary
twenty-two countries shortly after the opening of the signature date.
V. ARTICLE 12: WHAT LAW APPLIES TO DETAINEES
HELD IN VIOLATION OF THE NTC?
Article 12 addresses the treatment of detainees who are taken into
custody for violation of Article 2 of the NTC.122 The addition of Article 12
in the NTC is interesting in the context of the international debate
concerning current alleged violations of international law and human rights
pertaining to the treatment of detainees. 123 Article 12 provides that:
Any person who is taken into custody or regarding whom any
other measures are taken or proceedings are carried out pursuant
to this Convention shall be guaranteed fair treatment, including
enjoyment of all rights and guarantees in conformity with the law
of the State in the territory of which that person is present and
applicable provisions of international law, including international
law of human rights. 1
24
The text of Article 12 describes "fair treatment" as the enjoyment of all
rights and guarantees as defined within two different sets of law: state law
and international law.125 However, the vague language of Article 12 makes
it difficult to ascertain which state law and international law will apply to
the treatment of detainees. 26 These ambiguities pose a serious problem as
to the treatment of detainees who are held in violation of Article 2 in the
determination of which law applies, and is increasingly important, since
many people may be detained for violating Article 2 due to the increased
threat of nuclear terrorism. 1
27
121. Id.
122. NTC, supra note 8, art. 12.
123. The Status of Persons Held in Guantanamo, supra note 6, at 97.
124. NTC, supra note 8, art. 12.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (discussing the possibilities of a nuclear
terrorist attack).
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A. State Law and Article 12
First, the state law that will dictate what rights and guarantees that will
be afforded to detainees is "the law of the State in the territory of which that
person is present.' 28 This appears to mean that the law of the detaining
power will not apply, rather, the law of the territory where the detainee is
held.' 29 However, a reasonable interpretation exists that the domestic law
of the country detaining the individual should apply. An issue as to what
domestic law should apply may arise in a situation where United States
troops have arrested an individual in Iraq for violating Article 2 and then
detains him or her at Abu Ghraib. Thus, the question arises as to whether
Iraq law or United States law applies. 30 One would argue that by strictly
construing the language of Article 12, Iraq law applies, since that is the
territory that the person is detained in.13  On the other hand, one could
argue that United States law should apply since it is the detaining power.
32
Article 11 provides additional guidance as to which State Party's law
would apply. 33  Prior to Article 11 being applied, the State Party must
establish jurisdiction pursuant to Article 9 of the NTC.134 Accordingly, a
State Party can exercise jurisdiction if the offense committed was against a
national of that State. 135 Therefore, if an offense was committed against a
national of the United States in a region outside of the United States, the
United States could exercise jurisdiction and would have to abide by Article
.136
Subsequently, Article 11 requires that the State Party exercising
jurisdiction in the territory where the offender is present, whether or not the
offence was committed in its territory, prosecute the case without undue
128. NTC, supra note 8, art. 2, 12.
129. Id.
130. Id. art. 12.
131. Id.
132. STEVEN C. WELSH, ESQ., NUCLEAR TERRORISM & DETAINEE POLICIES: INTERNATIONAL
CONVENTION FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF ACTS OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM (June 17, 2005), available at
http://www.cdi.org/news/law/ntc-detainees.cfm (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).
133. NTC, supra note 8, art. 11; Article 11, Paragraph I in pertinent part states that "[tihe State
Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is present shall, in cases to which article 9 applies ...
be obliged ... to submit the case without undue delay to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution, through proceedings in accordance with the laws of that State. Those authorities shall take
their decision in the same manner as in the case of any other offence of a grave nature under the law of
that State." Id. para. 1.
134. NTC, supra note 8, art. 9.
135. Id. art. 9, para. 2(a).
136. Id. art. ll.
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delay according to that State Party's laws. 137  It can be inferred from the
language of Article 11, that if a person is detained he will be guaranteed fair
treatment according to the detaining State Party's domestic law if the State
Party establishes jurisdiction. 3  If the detaining State Party does not
establish jurisdiction, then, whichever State Party establishes jurisdiction
will apply its domestic law.'
39
If United States law were to apply, the determination of what rights
that individual has is dependent on what territory he is located in.' 40  If an
individual is detained at Guantanamo Bay or within the United States, he
would still be afforded due process rights.' 4' But, this does not mean that
these individuals would be guaranteed fair treatment pursuant to Article
12.142 The United States government contends that it affords detainees fair
treatment by not subjecting them to "physical or mental abuse or cruel
treatment.' 43  However, this statement is inconsistent with the many
allegations of abuse that have led detainees to attempt suicide.' 44  The
inability of Article 12 to specify exactly what constitutes fair treatment,
1 45
similar to the United States position towards detainees at Guantanamo Bay,
leaves this term open to subjective interpretation.'"
However, if a non-resident individual was detained for violation of the
NTC in a region that the United States could not exercise jurisdiction
over,147 like Iraq, he is not afforded constitutional rights.148 Additionally, if
137. Id. art. 11, para. 1.
138. Id.
139. NTC, supra note 8, art.11, para. 1.
140. See id art. 12 (discussing the issue of jurisdiction in relation to exclusive territorial
jurisdiction and sovereignty).
141. See Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 464 (alien detainees held at
Guantanamo Bay were afforded due process rights).
142. NTC, supra note 8, art. 12.
143. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002)
[hereinafter Status of Detainees at Guantanamo], available at
http'./www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/print/20020207-13.html (last visited Sept. 30,2005).
144. Gall, supra note 26; see also notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
145. Welsh, supra note 132.
146. Status of Detainees at Guantanamo, supra note 143; see also William J. Haynes II,
General Counsel of the U.S. Dep't of Defense on Counter-Resistance Techniques, Memorandum to
Sec'y of Defense (Nov. 27, 2002), available at http.//www.cdi.org/LAWS/haynes-counter-resistance-
I 12702.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2005). For example, General Counsel for the Department of Defense
William J. Haynes 11, in a memo to the Sec'y of Defense regarding interrogation practices at
Guantanamo Bay, questioned why detainees could not be forced to stand longer than four hours a day
since he stands for eight to ten hours a day during his workday. Id. Haynes completely neglected the
reason that the detainees are forced to stand for prolonged periods of time is used as an interrogation
tactic, not in the furtherance of their career. Id.
147. See supra text accompanying note 90.
2006] Demner
ILSA Journal of Int'l & Comparative Law
an individual is classified as an enemy combatant, he would not be able to
challenge his classification with the CSRT. 149  Even though he must be
prosecuted without undue delay pursuant to Article 11,150 this may not
occur given that Guantanamo Bay detainees have been detained for years
without official charges being brought against them.
15
'
B. International Law and Article 12
The most ambiguous language of Article 12 is the phrase "applicable
provisions of international law, including international law of human
rights," since it fails to state what international law will apply. 52  The
reason that this phrase is so problematic is due to the position that the
United States is taking in determining the status of detainees in
Guantanamo Bay. 53 The problem that arose is the classification given to
these detainees by the United States as unlawful combatants who were not
afforded the protections of the Geneva Conventions.
54
Throughout the U.N. resolutions promulgated during the negotiation of
the NTC, it is never specified as to what international law will apply.
155
Rather, the resolutions refer to international law by stating that the NTC
will be in "accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
relevant provisions of international law, including international standards of
human rights.. ,,156 and in other portions of the Official Record refers to
international humanitarian law.157 However, during the drafting of the
NTC, representatives from Egypt submitted a proposal to include the
elements of international humanitarian law, but withdrew their proposal for
fear that their proposal would extend negotiations.
158
148. Eisentrager, 839 U.S. at 768 (holding that German prisoners convicted in China for
committing military activity against the United States had no constitutional rights and could not file a
habeas corpus petition in the U.S. courts).
149. Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 65.
150. NTC, supra note 8, art. 11, para 1.
151. Wilson, supra note 13.
152. NTC, supra note 8, art. 12.
153. Fleischer, supra note 43.
154. Id.
155. See G.A. Res. 51/210,13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (Dec. 17, 1996); See also G.A. Res.
59/46, IM 3, 8, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/46 (Dec. 16,2004).
156. G.A. Res. 46,supra note 155,13.
157. U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 91st plen. mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.91 (Apr. 13, 2005)
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/59/PV.91] (Mr. Konuzin from the Russian Federation refers to international
law by including the phrase "protection of human rights and respect for international humanitarian
law.").
158. Id.
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The unfortunate consequence of the ambiguous language of Article 12
is that it allows the United States and other countries the ability to apply the
same policy the United States is currently implementing in its war on
terror. 9 The individuals detained at Guantanamo Bay and Abu Ghraib
have not been granted the protections of the Geneva Conventions or other
doctrines of international humanitarian law, even though their incarceration
may be for a life term; rather, the United States has created a loophole.'
6
The end result of the loophole is that international humanitarian law does
not apply to these detainees; rather, the United States has created its own
international standards by establishing the CSRT, 16 1 which only applies to
detainees held at Guantanamo Bay. 162 However, the procedures established
by the CSRT have been deemed inadequate, 63 which places the detainees
back to the beginning of their battle for freedom.
Additionally, the inadequacies of the CSRT are exhibited by Rear
Admiral James M. McGarrah, the Director of Administrative Review of the
Detention of Enemy Combatants', testimony to the United States
Committee on the Judiciary on June 15, 2005.'64 McGarrah testifies that in
less than six months all 558 detainees at Guantanamo Bay were granted
hearings pursuant to CSRT to determine if they were properly classified as
"enemy combatants.' 65 Of those 558 hearings, only thirty-eight detainees
were found to no longer meet "the criteria for enemy combatant
designation."' 66 This testimony creates an inference that no detainees were
ever improperly classified as "enemy combatants," since McGarrah stated
that they no longer meet the criteria, 167 indicating that at some point they
did meet this criteria. The inadequacies with McGarrah's testimony are
two-fold. First, it is hard to imagine that out of 558 detainees, not one was
classified improperly as an "enemy combatant" due to the procedures
established prior to the creation of the CSRT in determining detainees'
classifications. Second, it is nearly impossible that in less than six months,
159. The Status of Persons Held in Guantanamo, supra note 6, at 102.
160. See generally id.
161. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 450.
162. Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 65.
163. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 468. The procedures employed by the
"CSRT failed to provide any detainee with sufficient notice of he factual basis for which he is being
detained and with a fair opportunity to rebut the government's evidence supporting the determination
that he is an 'enemy combatant."' Id. Additionally, the CSRT relied on classified information in
making their determination that a detainee was an "enemy combatant", failing to provide the detainee
with the same information and the assistance of counsel. Id.
164. See McGarrah Hearing, supra note 84.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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the 558 hearings that were held could have been properly conducted to meet
minimum due process requirements as established by In re Guantanamo
Detainee Cases. 16
8
Just like detainees who are classified as "enemy combatants" by the
United States in the "war on terror," individuals detained for violations of
the NTC may also be classified as "enemy combatants," which would limit
their ability to challenge their detainment. Pursuant to United States policy,
if the United States arrested Taliban detainees for violation of Article 2,
they would be afforded the protections of the Geneva Conventions.' 69
Accordingly, if these Taliban detainees were classified as "enemy
combatants," they could challenge their classification by claiming that they
should be afforded POW status pursuant to the procedure explained in
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention. 70
However, al-Qaeda detainees, as well as Taliban detainees who are not
POWs, are left to challenge their enemy combatant status with the CSRT
and the United States courts only if they are detained at Guantanamo
Bay. 17' Also, it is possible that the United States can claim that it is entitled
to detain people in violation of the NTC for an indefinite period pursuant to
the AUMF,' 7 even though these procedures and protections afforded by the
CSRT have been deemed inadequate.
173
VI. EFFECT OF THE UNITED STATES SIGNING THE NTC
Once the United States signs the NTC, it would effectively agree to
abide, "at least in principle," by all the articles of the treaties, including
Article 12.174 This would pose a problem to the United States, since it has
created loopholes to avoid abiding with international humanitarian law. 175
Due to the ambiguous language of the NTC, the United States probably will
conform with Article 12 if it maintains the same policies implemented
presently. However, it appears that the international community will not
168. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 472; see also supra notes 79-83 and
accompanying text (discussing the procedures that the CSRT must follow in order for detainees to be
granted their rights pursuant to the due process clause).
169. Fleischer, supra note 43.
170. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 39, art. 5.
171. Wolfowitz Memorandum, supra note 65.
172. AUMF, supra note 3.
173. Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp 2d at 472 (holding that the procedures within
the CSRT are inadequate for failure to provide counsel and allow detainees access to classified
information used by the U.S. officials to determine "enemy combatant" status).
174. Welsh, supra note 132.
175. The Status of Persons Held in Guantanamo, supra note 6, at 98.
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allow the United States to take this position for much longer. 176 It is hard to
imagine that the intent of the drafters of the NTC was that individuals
detained for violations of Article 2 would fall into a "legal black hole" in
not receiving any protection of international humanitarian law. Also, it
doesn't appear that an indefinite detention is what the drafters meant when
including the provisions of "international law of human rights.'
' 77
The United States' credibility and reputation has deteriorated ever
since human rights violations occurred at Guantanamo Bay and Abu
Ghraib.77 The United States lacks credibility, since its behavior in Iraq is
hypocritical to its position as to why the United States invaded Iraq. 79 In
order for the United States to attempt to improve its credibility and
reputation within the international community, it is imperative that the
United States change its position regarding the classification of detainees.
Additionally, if the United States were to change its policy and the NTC
were implemented, this would be a good way for the United States to regain
trust from the international community.
VII. CONCLUSION
International terrorism is a real and imminent threat to the international
community, especially the possibility of a nuclear attack. The NTC has
great potential to create a legal framework to combat nuclear terrorism.
However, this can only happen if the international community is closely
connected. Due to the United States position on classifying detainees as
enemy combatants, disdain has grown among leaders of countries,
eliminating the possibilities of cooperation to combat terrorism. The United
States can gain credibility by complying with international humanitarian
law with the adoption of the NTC. Even though the language of the NTC is
ambiguous, which allows the United States to continue to classify detainees
as enemy combatants, the United States should abide by these international
doctrines in order to provide for the fair treatment of detainees.
176. Wilson, supra note 13.
177. U.N. Doc. A/591PV.91, supra note 157.
178. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that the government's position
is "so extreme that it raises the gravest concerns under both American and international law." Gherebi,
374 F.3d at 738.
179. McGeary, supra note 31; President George W. Bush's convoluted rationales for invading
Iraq include: the elimination of torture and the treatment of Iraqi prisons, including the Abu Ghraib
prison, the liberation of Iraqis, and to find weapons of mass destruction. Id. Since it has been
discovered that weapons of mass destruction do not exist in Iraq, the clear rationale to continue the
occupation of Iraq is to liberate the Iraqi's and eliminate torture and cruel and inhumane treatment at
Iraqi prisons. Id. Quite to the contrary, the U.S. has maintained the same inhumane policies in Iraq,
especially at Abu Ghraib, that Saddam Hussein's dictatorship had implemented, eliminating any
justification as to the justification for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Id.
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